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Treating Crazy People Less Specially 
STEPHEN J. MORSE* t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mental health laws treat mentally disordered people differently 
from other adults in virtually every area of civil and criminal law .1 
Some mental health laws provide a benefit the crazy person desires. 
Examples are the disordered person's opportunity to defeat a crim-
inal prosecution by claiming legal insanity or to avoid a contract 
by claiming incompetence to contract. Other mental health laws, 
such as provisions for involuntary commitment and treatment, op-
erate contrary to the crazy person's desires. In all cases, however, 
special legal treatment results from the assumption that crazy per-
sons are not responsible for their behavior, an assumption buttressed 
by the mistaken and usually unanalyzed notion that mental disorder 
per se deprives people of responsibility. 
The best recent example of the adoption of this incorrect as-
sumption, "the common wisdom," is the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 2 
which held that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classifi-
cation. The Court rejected the argument that, under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, laws that distinguish the retarded as a class should 
be subjected to particularly careful examination to determine if they 
substantially further an important governmental purpose. Although 
the case dealt specifically with retarded people, the majority rec-
ognized that its reasoning also applied to the mentally ill, and thus 
• Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, USC Law Center. 
This article was fir st presented as the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lecture at the West Virginia 
University College of Law, March , 1987. In revised form, it will appear in the author' s forthcoming 
book, The Jurisprudence of Craziness (Oxford University Press). I want to thank Heidi M. Hurd for 
editorial assistance and Brad Kuenning for research assistance. 
t Copyright 1987 by S. J. Morse . 
I. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WIENER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d ed. 
1985). 
2. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S . 432 (1985). 
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the decision makes it eas1er fo r legislatures to distinguish the men- I 
tally disordered. l 
To support its holding , the Court determined that retarded 
people have ' 'reduced ability to cope with and function in the eve-
ryday world. " 3 Down playing the history of discrimination and an-
tipathy towards the retarded and their political powerlessness, the 
Court also concluded that: 
[S]ingling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the rea l and undeniable 
differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent society 
expects and approves such legislat ion indicates that governmental consideration 
of those differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but 
. . . des irable." 
Although the Court recognized that retarded people differ substan-
tially in their ability to cope and that the disabilities of some are 
not immediately evident , it refused to apply heightened scrutiny to 
laws that distinguish the retarded as a class. 5 
In sum, the law's present view is that great deference must be 
granted to legislative decisions to treat retarded and mentally dis-
ordered people specially because the retarded and the mentally dis-
ordered as entire classes are specially unable to cope with the demands 
of the world. Thus all mental health laws deprive allegedly crazy 
persons of the usual, dignity-conferring presumptions of responsi-
bility and competence. 
I suggest, however, that fewer crazy persons are nonresponsible 
and incompetent than is commonly supposed. The behavior of some 
crazy people surely satisfies the correct general criteria of nonres-
ponsibility-irrationality and compulsion. 6 Nevertheless, the com-
mon wisdom is too sweeping; laypersons and mental health 
3. Id. at 422. 
4. ld. at 444. 
5. For a sensitive reading of Cleburne that distinguishes three approaches to treating classes 
of "different" people-"the 'abnormal persons' approach," the "rights analysis approach," and the 
"social relations approach"-see Minow, Wh en Difference Has Its Hom e: Group Homes for the 
Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV . C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. Ill (1987). 
6. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in THE LAw AS A BEHAVIORAL 
I NSTRUMENT: NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 35, 59-7 1 (G. Melton ed . 1986). / 
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professionals alike tend consistently to underestimate the capabilities 
of crazy people. Thus, even when the legal system tightens mental 
health law criteria and procedures, as it did for involuntary com-
mitment in the 1970s, the law continues to ensnare large numbers 
of crazy people because decisionmakers guided by the "common 
wisdom" fail in practice to apply strictly the laws on the books. 
Even reformed laws sweep far too broadly because crazy people are 
far more responsible than is usually assumed. Finally, singling out 
crazy people for special legal treatment is often not the optimal 
means to achieve the social purposes that the behavioral components 
of mental health laws are meant to achieve. 
II. POLITICAL AND MORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of mental health laws differs at various times; some-
times the law seems willing to treat many people specially and at 
other times the law treats few specially. Policy shifts can result from 
changes in political or social preferences, from changes in conclu-
sions about the capabilities of crazy people, or, more probably, from 
some combination of both. But differing conclusions about the ca-
pabilities of crazy people do not logically entail political and legal 
changes. For example, assume that behavioral scientists were able 
rigorously to confirm that crazy people are substantially less able 
to behave rationally than we currently suppose. Assume further that 
the mentally disordered as a class were considered legally responsible 
in general prior to the new scientific findings. If the standards for 
legal responsibility did not shift, we might conclude that laws treat-
ing the disordered as less responsible were now justified. But if so-
ciety simultaneously decided on moral and political grounds to lower 
the threshold for legal responsibility, the mentally disordered as a 
class might still be capable of meeting the general standards, and 
special laws would not be justified. Thus, the political and legal 
consequences that follow from an accurate view of the capabilities 
of crazy people depend on one's political and moral preferences. 
Before assessing the capabilities of crazy people, it is therefore 
necessary to make explicit the moral and political preferences that 
inform my legal recommendations. I will not offer any foundational 
justification for these preferences because I do not believe such foun-
I 
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dations can be provided. 7 What I hope to offer instead is an in-
ternally coherent account that entails a strong preference for negative 
liberty and autonomy, 8 for respecting persons' stated, present pre-
ferences, for erring on the side of leaving persons alone to do as 
they wish, and for treating all persons alike and as responsible and 
competent citizens as often as possible .9 I wish to examine the im-
plications of applying these views to mentally disordered people. 
Now let me be more specific about the preference for liberty. 
First, a preference for liberty entails the adoption of a non-ideal, 
"desire" theory of the good life that assumes that persons are the 
best judges of what is good for them and that there is no ''true'' 
good independent of a person's tastes, preferences, values and de-
sires. 10 Pluralist liberal societies are based on such assumptions. Ra-
tionality or some minimalist conception of primary goods may 
constrain this view-some desires or preferences may be so out-
landish, for example, that we are unwilling to credit the person as 
a rational being-but a non-ideal theory of the good life will em-
phasize a subjective view of the good and thus will insist on caution 
before we may claim that what a person prefers is not good for 
him. Unwanted personal or state intervention into another's life re-
quires stronger justification according to a non-ideal theory than 
according to an ideal theory that defines the good independently of 
preferences as virtue, excellence, or achievement. The non-ideal view 
would presume strongly, but not conclusively, that the mentally dis-
ordered and the mentally normal alike know what is best for them. 
Second, a preference for liberty entails the adoption of the re-
lated assumption that a person's true preferences or desires are those 
7. See generally D. HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAl. THEORY (1985). 
8. My usage of negative liberty follows that most famously associated with Isaiah Berlin in 
his seminal essay, I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR EssAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvii, 118 (1969). 
9 . My preferences most closely approximate what Martha Minow identifies as the "rights 
analysis approach." Minow, supra note 5, at 122-27, 153-57. Unlike Professor Minow, however, I 
do not believe that the rights analysis approach is inconsistent with a contextualist approach to knowl-
edge or with the many benefits that might flow from the social relations approach. !d. at 184-86. 
For example, a redefinition of the significance of human traits to enhance relationships between people 
is consistent with a rights analysis approach. See infra text accompanying note 44. 
10. On the distinction between "ideal" and "desire" theories of the good, see, e.g. , Brock, 
Paternalism and Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM 237, 250-54 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983) . 
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he or she claims, even if those preferences seem imprudent, harmful, 
or immoral. This subjective assumption strongly presumes that the 
person knows best what his or her preferences are. Conversely, this 
assumption rejects idealized, exalted metaphysical notions of a per-
son 's will, which hold that the person's " real" desires, despite his 
or her claims to the contrary, are those a hypothetical, ideally ra-
tional person might choose. 11 It also rejects claims that a person's 
real preferences are unconscious, psychodynamic wishes the person 
may be unable to acknowledge. 12 
Rejecting "ideal" or unconscious preferences as real preferences 
does not mean that a person's behavior is not sometimes foolish 
and is not on some occasions caused by unconscious psychological 
determinants. It does mean, however, that a person's stated pre-
ferences are his or her preferences, whether or not they seem "fully" 
rational and without regard to how they are caused. To assume 
otherwise is to deprive a person of integrity and autonomy. The 
subjective assumption that a person best understands his or her own 
preferences demands that great caution be exercised before permit-
ting external observers to impose unwanted paternalistic impositions 
on the ground that the observer knows the person's "real" prefer-
ences better and is thus doing what the person "really" wants. 
Third, a preference for liberty entails, either on consequential 
or nonconsequential grounds, the assumption that the deprivation 
of negative liberty is generally harmful. Whether treated as a de-
ontological trump or as a thumb · on the consequential scale, liberty 
is entitled to great and perhaps decisive weight. Liberty is so im-
portant that decisionmakers should be cautious either about de-
priving a person of the trump because he or she is nonresponsible 
or about overweighing other factors in a consequential balance. 
Fourth, a preference for liberty entails the assumption that re-
sponsibility and competence should be treated as threshold rather 
11. On hypothetical rationality, see J . FEINBERG, 3 HARM TO SELF: THE MoRAL LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 184-86 (1986); J. KLEINIG , PATERNALISM 63-67 (1984). 
12. See Morse , Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 
68 VA . L. REV. 971, 991-1039 (1982). 
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than relativistic concepts 13 and that the law should set the threshold 
quite low. If we think of responsibility and competence as distributed 
along a continuum, then in a sense everyone is less responsible or 
competent than people who are more so. Thus, in the abstract, the 
law could allocate liberty benefits proportionately to one's degree 
of responsibility and competence; more responsible and competent 
people would have more legal autonomy and liberty and vice versa 
along the continuum. This is the relativist concept. The alternative, 
threshold concept treats responsibility and competence as bright lines. 
Once a person exceeds the threshold, he or she is considered fully 
responsible or competent, and those on the other side of the thresh-
old are treated as nonresponsible or incompetent. 
The threshold concept, with the threshold set quite low, is pref-
erable because it grants more autonomy and liberty to more people 
more of the time, thus treating more people as full persons worthy 
of dignity and respect. Although our society should not have un-
realistic expectations and standards for our most mentally disabled 
citizens, most people should be considered responsible and com-
petent. In other words, the law should not require an unrealistically 
high or ideal degree of rationality or ability in order to hold people 
responsible or competent. Indeed, if we consider the enormous 
amount of seemingly foolish, harmful, and otherwise poorly per-
formed behavior we would not dream of preventing, it appears that 
the law already makes this assumption. Moreover, a threshold con-
cept is far easier to devise and administer. Setting a low threshold 
for responsibility and competence again insures caution before treat-
ing any class of people as nonresponsible or incompetent. 
None of the four assumptions is inviolable. For example, some 
people may be so irrational that depriving them of negative liberty 
in order to restore their responsibility and competence might be jus-
tified. Indeed, the primary justification for preferring negative lib-
erty is that rational persons best know and can maximize their own 
13. A helpful discussion of the distinction between the relativistic and the threshold sense of 
competence is, Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, in PATERNALISM 83, 85-91 (R.Sartorius 
ed. 1983). 
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desires. Nevertheless, strong theoretical and factual reasons would 
always be necessary to override the assumptions. 
\Vhy should anyone adopt the assumptions that I have enunciated 
as the components of a preference for liberty? As stated at the 
outset, I cannot provide an uncontroversial conceptual or empirical 
foundation for them. But I can ask you to try empathetically to 
imagine what society would be like if the law were constrained by 
these assumptions . Would more people be happy or satisfied or con-
sider their lives worthwhile than if the law adopted a different vision? 
Stated another way, would more people, including the mentally dis-
ordered, flourish or be better off? We cannot know; we can only 
estimate, but most public policy is based upon such estimations. In 
making such an estimation, I believe it is appropriate to adopt the 
vantagepoint of late twentieth century Americans, with their values, 
predispositions, preferences, and knowledge of themselves and his-
tory. Although the Rawlsian vantage point of an ideally rational 
observer, unaffected by culture and history, is of course appealing, 
it is unlikely to help us make policy m light of who we are and 
who we might realistically become. 
A final assumption crucial to proper mental health lawmaking 
is that the ultimate question in mental health law is always social, 
moral, political, and legal. Whether and according to what criteria 
people should be considered nonresponsible or incompetent are not 
medical, psychiatric, or psychological questions that can be coher-
ently asked and answered in these terms. Mental health scientists 
and clinicians may in some instances be able to provide lawmakers 
with relevant data concerning the capabilities and behavior of crazy 
people, but the normative consequences of crazy behavior are not 
medical issues. Therefore, social and legal decisionmakers cannot 
abdicate their responsibility to decide normative issues by mistakenly 
assuming that the issues are medical rather than moral and legal. 
Adopting the assumptions described-a preference for liberty and 
treating mental health law issues as legal-does not entail the further 
assumption that all adults or classes of adults must be deemed re-
sponsible. Some people or classes of people may be so far below 
any reasonable threshold that caution will not prevent us from pro-
viding for special legal treatment. But if lawmakers take liberty se-
360 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
riously and recognize that the fundamental issues are legal, they must 
consider the evidence very carefully and must take responsibility for 
making the normative choice to treat crazy persons specially. The 
basic assumptions surely mean that we cannot differentiate crazy 
people simply on the basis of a label, "mental disorder," or on the 
basis of the question-begging assumption that "they must be non-
responsible because they're sick." Furthermore, no matter how pre-
cisely we define the class of mentally disordered people, there will 
be substantial differences among the people in the class that will 
require carefully individualized decision making in all legal contexts. 
The assumptions also enjoin us to find least restrictive means to 
respond to those situations in which we are confident about our 
judgments of nonresponsibility. Finally, the assumptions mean that 
we should be extremely hesitant to intervene in a person's life against 
his or her own wishes and for what we believe to be his or her own 
good. If we do intervene paternalistically, we should be certain not 
only that the means chosen are the least intrusive, but also that they 
are reasonably sure to produce the benefit that the person would 
have wanted for him or herself. 
III. How DIFFERENT ARE CRAZY PEOPLE? 
The most radical move one can make to support the general 
thesis that crazy people are responsible and should not be treated 
specially is to claim that mental disorder is a myth, a claim most 
famously argued in the provocative work of psychiatrist Thomas 
Szasz. 14 Although I agree with some of the conceptual criticisms of 
mental health science and many of the political criticisms of mental 
health law made by those who consider mental illness a myth, 15 I 
do not share their basic premise. Crazy behavior, however one wishes 
to conceptualize it, exists, causes suffering and disability, and some-
times may deprive the crazy person of responsibility. Nonetheless, 
as a normative matter, the law should design and interpret mental 
health laws to assure narrow application. In a society that prefers 
liberty, the class of people the law treats specially should be small, 
14. T . SZASZ, THE MYTH OF M ENTAL ILLNESS (1974) . 
15. See especially T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND P SYCHIATRY (1963) and T . SZASZ, I NSANITY: 
THE I DEA AND I TS CONSEQUENCES (1987) . 
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and legal decision making should err on the side of responsibility. 
No human being is perfectly rational, and all are subject to con-
ditions that on occasion make the choice to behave correctly or 
appropriately difficult. Nonetheless, we assume that most of us are 
capable of behaving rationally or resisting the desire to behave 
wrongly in difficult situations. Although these capabilities vary sub-
stantially among normal people, we assume that even the least ca-
pable normal person can behave minimally rationally with a 
reasonable amount of effort. The informal social and formal legal 
criteria for responsibility are not difficult for most people to attain 
under most circumstances. Thus, a normal person is considered to 
be responsible even if he or she behaves irrationally or is faced with 
and yields to most hard choices. By contrast, when crazy people 
behave irrationally or are swayed by the hard choices that their 
impulses may produce, we assume that they are not capable of be-
having rationally or of mastering the desire to behave as their im-
pulses predispose. We believe that anyone who behaves sufficiently 
crazily must be incapable of responsible behavior because no one 
who could behave otherwise would behave so crazily. 
The capability for responsible behavior varies along a continuum. 
At the extremes, we can be quite sure of our judgments: the con-
sistently rational person whose every action bespeaks firmness of 
self-control is of course capable of responsible behavior, and the 
person who behaves consistently and severely crazily is not. The hard 
question, as always, for legal policymakers and legal decisionmakers 
is where to draw the line. Which class of crazy people and which 
individual persons are so crazy that we may justly assume that they 
are not capable under any reasonable set of conditions of responsible 
behavior? There are no scientific answers to either of these ques-
tions, but there is relevant empirical evidence available to inform 
normative legal decisionmakers. On the basis of this evidence, I 
conclude that the vast majority of crazy people, including many who 
are severely crazy, are capable of behaving minimally rationally or 
resisting hard choices. 
Considering the responsibility of crazy people requires exami-
nation of the total range of their behavior, including their noncrazy 
behavior, and comparison of it to normal peoples' behavior. Unless 
362 WEST VIRGINIA LA ~V REVIEW [Vol. 90 
one does so, it is too easy to conclude that crazy people are uni-
formiy crazy and cleanly distinguishable from those considered nor-
mal. I shall consider the following types of evidence: clinical 
observations of crazy people, empirical research comparing crazy 
people to normals, and empirical 1 esearch bearing directly on the 
rationality and normality of crazy people. If crazy people are not 
as different from normal people as one might suppose, and if crazy 
people demonstrate a great deal of normal, rational behavior, then 
perhaps they are more capable of responsible behavior than we usu-
ally assume, and thus the law should treat them less specially. 
First, it is a striking clinical commonplace that crazy people, 
including the craziest, behave normally much of the time and in 
many ways. Even when they are in the midst of a period of crazy 
behavior, much of their behavior will be normal. 16 Between crazy 
periods, crazy people are not reliably distinguishable from normal 
persons. As a general matter, then, crazy people are by no means 
constantly crazy, nor are all their behaviors crazy, and even when 
behaving crazily, much of their behavior will be normal. Simple 
observation thus confirms that even the craziest people retain sub-
stantial capability to behave relatively normally. 
Nonetheless, some crazy people occasionally may be incapable 
of behaving rationally. If one looks at the behavior and life histories 
of these people, there is apparently no other way reasonably to con-
strue some of their conduct. But we cannot reach this conclusion 
simply because the person is diagnosable and may exhibit substantial 
crazy behavior. We must examine the total range of a person's be-
havior. We assume on the one hand that no one capable of ra-
tionality would behave so crazily; but on the other hand, there is 
much normal behavior to give us pause. At the least, it is unjustified 
to assert that crazy people as a class lack all capability for normal 
rational behavior. 
Second, much of the empirical research on craziness has at-
tempted to demonstrate that the performance of crazy people and 
16. See Lehmann & Cancro, Schizophrenia: Clinical Features, in 4 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 
OF PsYCHIATRY 680, 681-82 (H. Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1985). 
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normals differs on a wide variety of variables. For our purposes, 
studies that compare crazy people and normals on behavioral tasks 
are most relevant because physical and other differences are legally 
relevant only if expressed in behavior. People who behave rationally 
do not become nonresponsible simply because a physical variable 
systematically differentiates the diagnostic class to which they belong 
from other classes of responsible and non-diagnosable people . T his 
is true even if the physical attribute that distinguishes crazy people 
is abnormal according to a coherent biological or medical concept 
of abnormality. Rationality, not biological normality, is the touch-
stone of legal responsibility, and rationality is a behavioral criterion 
that is not vitiated merely by the presence of a biological abnor-
mality. 
It is impossible to review all the studies that have compared crazy 
people and normals, but a recent review reaches what I believe are 
still representative results. Two well-respected researchers, Theodore 
Sarbin and James Mancuso, reviewed 374 studies of people diag-
nosed as suffering from schizophrenia that appeared between 1959 
and 1978 in The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and its prede-
cessor, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 17 Sarbin 
and Mancuso chose these journals because they are prestigious jour-
nals with high standards for accepting manuscripts that publish the 
best efforts in the science of abnormal psychology. 
Sarbin and Mancuso heavily criticize both the methodology of 
many of the studies reviewed and the conceptual status of the cat-
egory of schizophrenia as a disease. Nonetheless, their most inter-
esting conclusions are those derived from a large group of studies 
that accept or at least employ the disease category, schizophrenia, 
and that compare the differences in performance between those di-
agnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and those considered nor-
mal. In brief, Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that although there are 
small mean differences that favor the normals, "from inspection of 
the data, it is abundantly clear that most persons identified as schi-
zophrenics do not function differently from most persons identified 
17. T. SARBIN & J. MANCUSO, SCHIZOPHRENIA: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR MORAL VERDICT? 22-
51 (1980). 
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as nonschizophrenics. " 18 In other words, the distributions of schi-
zophrenics and nonschizophrenics on the tested variables overlap 
substantially. Moreover, the variability of the schizophrenics' scores 
is greater than that of the variability of the nonschizophrenics' scores. 
Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that ''the single most reliable pre-
diction to be made in studies of schizophrenics and nonschizo-
phrenics" is that "the variability of the scores of schizophrenics will 
be observably larger than the variability of the scores of control 
samples," and that "most experimental measures have shown that 
schizophrenics are very different one from the other." 19 In light of 
the overlap of the two populations and the greater variability of the 
performance of schizophrenics, Sarbin and Mancuso conclude that 
the small differences in sample means do not mean that schizo-
phrenics differ from normals. In sum, "one could not tell the 'sick' 
from the 'well' by the scores on the dependent measures [the tested 
variables].' ' 20 Moreover, if one subjects the studies from which these 
conclusions are drawn to a complete methodological critique, the 
conclusion that there are substantial differences becomes weaker still 
because there are sufficient flaws to warrant substantial caution about 
the conclusions. 
The studies Sarbin and Mancuso reviewed dealt only with schiz-
ophrenia and used pre-DSM-III criteria21 for identifying those di-
agnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. DSM-III's diagnostic 
criteria are narrower than those of its predecessors, and thus one 
might expect the differences to be greater in studies performed after 
the 1980 adoption of DSM-III. On the other hand, many post-1980 
studies still use non-DSM-III criteria, and my review of the more 
recent literature, although not as complete or systematic as Sarbin 
and Mancuso's, provides no reason to believe that their primary 
18 . !d. at 47. 
19. !d. at 50 (emphasis in original). 
20. !d. at 51. 
21. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III] includes the diagnostic criteria for all the menta l 
disorders currently identified by the APA. DSM-III's diagnostic criteria are far more explicit than 
those of its predecessor, DSM-II (1968). A revised version of the third edition, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MAN UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (Jd ed. rev .) was published in 1987 [hereinafter DSM-
III-R]. Publication of DSM-IV is anticipated in the 1990's. 
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conclusions are now invalid. I also suggest that their conclusions-
small mean differences, high intragroup variance, substantial overlap 
of distributions-hold for the smaller number of studies that com-
pare other diagnostic groups, such as those suffering from affective 
disorders, to normalsY Further, most of the behavioral deficits pres-
ent in disordered persons are common in normals as well. 23 Finally, 
Sarbin and Nlancuso suggest that ''disguised variables'' that were 
not and still are not controlled for in most studies could account 
for most of the differences that do exist. 24 These disguised variables, 
such as socioeconomic status, are not the types of variables that 
bear on responsibility. Thus, even if they, rather than mental dis-
order, account for the measured differences, this would not indicate 
that the mentally disordered are distinguishable in legally relevant 
ways. 
Almost none of the studies Sarbin and Mancuso review or others 
to which I refer address differences in genetic, biochemical, neu-
rological, or other biological variables. Recent literature contains 
many studies that find such differences and conclude that there are 
real biological differences between normals and various types of dis-
ordered people. 25 Although many of these studies may have meth-
22. See, e.g. , Layne, Painful Truths About Depressives' Cognition, 39 J . CLINICAL PsYCHOLOGY 
848 (1983). But see, e.g., Dobson & Shaw, 10 CoGNITIVE THERAPY & REs . 13 (1986). Again, the point 
is not that there are no differences or that the mentally disordered suffer no deficits; rather, it is 
simply that the differences are much less significant than we commonly assume. 
23. Harrow & Quinlan, Is Disordered Thinking Unique to Schizophrenia?, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PsYCHIATRY 15, 19-21 (1977); Lehmann & Cancro, supra note 14, at 681. Moreover, when schizo-
phrenics show greater thought disorder than normals, in some cases the cognitive defect can be easily 
modified, leading to the possible conclusion that thought disorder is not a valid indicator of schiz-
ophrenia. K. SALZINGER, ScHIZOPHRENIA: 8EHAVORIAL AsPECTS 64-65 (1973) . See also King & Sheridan, 
Problem-Solving Characteristics of Process and Reactive Schizophrenics and Affective-Disordered Pa-
tients, 94 J . ABNORMAL PsYCHOLOGY 17 (1985) (study failed to find, contrary to usual finding, that 
there are not cognitive deficiencies specific to schizophrenia). The easy modifiability of much thought 
disorder also suggests that this type of abnormal thinking may not be beyond the person's rational 
control. 
24. T. SARBIN & J. MANCUSO, supra note 17 at 52-80. 
25. E.g., Egeland, Gerhard, Pauls, Sussex, Kidd, Allen, Hostetter & Housman, Bipolar Af-
fective Disorders Linked to DNA Markers on Chromosome lJ, 325 NATURE 783 (1987); Wong, Wag-
ner, Tune, Dannals, Pearlson, Links, Tamminga, Broussolle, Raver!, Wilson, Young, Malat, Williams, 
O'Tuama, Snyder, Kuhar & Gjedde, Positron Emission Tomography Reveals Elevated D2 Dopamine 
Receptors in Drug-Naive Schizophrenics , 234 ScrENCE 1558 (1986) . See also Hodgkinson, Sherrington, 
Gurling , Marchbanks, Reeders, Mallet, Mcinnis, Petursson and Brynjolfsson, Molecular Genetic-
Evidence for Heterogeneity in Manic Depression, 325 NATURE 805 (1987) (evidence for genetic het-
erogeneity of linkage, rather than a single locus, in manic depression). 
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odological flaws or have not yet been repiicated, 26 I assume that 
valid differences may someday be discovered Y Nevertheless, such 
a discovery, even if the distinguishing biological variable were ab-
normal, would have no necessary relevance for legally or socially 
distinguishing crazy people from normalsJ~ Biological variables are 
not per se the criteria for nonresponsibility . All behavior has some 
biological causes. The legal issue, how·ever, is whether the person 
is sufficiently nonculpably irrational or compelled. Differences in 
biology simply do not bear on responsibility if the actor behaves 
reasonably rationally and without compulsion. If a person is suf-
ficiently irrational or compelled to warrant special legal treatment, 
the failure to discover a biological abnormality does not mean that 
the person is responsible. 
None of the empirical research discussed above, which compares 
crazy people to normals, directly measured rationality and com-
pulsion. Therefore, its relevance in deciding whether the law should 
treat crazy people specially is limited. Nonetheless, it suggests that 
the behavioral differences between crazy and normal people are less 
pronounced than is usually supposed. 
A third type of evidence relevant to the law ' s decision to treat 
crazy people specially is found in studies that appear to measure 
more directly the rationality of crazy people. These studies often 
use as subjects hospitalized crazy people, those who are typically 
the most crazy. One series of studies deals with "impression man-
26 . E.g., Farde, Wiesel, Hall , Halldin , Stone-Elander & Sed vall, No D, Receptor Increase in 
PET Study of Schizophrenia, 44 ARCHIVES GEN. PsYCHIATRY 671 (1987) (a team of Scandinavian 
researchers using equivalent methodology were unable to replicate the findings of Wong et al, supra 
note 23). 
Despite increasing sophistication, " disguised" variables often are not controlled ; studies use dif-
ferent diagnostic criteria for the same disorder, rendering the studies noncom parable; and there are 
still studies without sufficient reliability checks on the diagnosis of the disordered group. Further, 
even if the disordered subjects are reliably distinguished from normals for research purposes, the 
validity of the diagnostic categories is no t established. DSM-111-R. supra note 19, at xxiv. It is not 
clear, th erefore, that measurable differences measure the differences between normals and those suf-
fering from a "real'' disorder. 
27. But see R . LEWONTIN, S. RosE & L KAMIN, NoT IN OuR GENES (1984) (reviewing the 
evidence for biological causation of a wide range of behaviors, including intelligence and schizophrenia, 
and concluding that the widely assumed biological determinist case is unproven now and is unlikely 
to be proven in the future). 
28. See Morse, supra note 6, at 48-50, 71-76. 
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agement,'' the ability of people to manipulate their own behavior 
to attain their goals. 29 In the case of disordered people, researchers 
studied hospitalized patients' attempts to vary their degree of cra-
ziness in order to manipulate hospital personnel. For example, many 
mental patients, even quite crazy ones, are able to convince hospital 
staff that they are either more or less crazy in order to remain in 
hospital, to gain privileges, or to be released. 30 
Some patients who engage in impression management may be 
unaware of their manipulations, a possibility that has led commen-
tators to claim with some justification that such unselfconscious be-
havior is not evidence of a patient's ability to cope rationally with 
the environment. Even if some patients lack such awareness, a not 
unreasonable supposition, this argument proves too much. The in-
ability to be aware of or correctly to identify one's "real" reasons 
for action is endemic among people generally31 and is hardly evidence 
of irrationality. There is no convincing evidence that crazy people 
especially lack the ability correctly to identify their "true" reasons 
for action. Even if they do, the class of people considered irrational 
would expand considerably if the lack of ability to know one's "real" 
reasons for action was a criterion for rationality. Indeed, some re-
searchers claim that awareness and correct identification of the causes 
for one's actions are much rarer than we assumeY The unself-
conscious ability to manipulate the environment successfully might 
be a sign of high social competence. Finally, it is simply not clear 
in impression management studies that the patients are unaware of 
what they are doing; much of the behavior is consistent primarily 
with the hypothesis that they are aware of their manipulations. The 
phrase chosen to describe the behavior, "impression management," 
connotes conscious and rational reasons for action. 
29. B. SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: THE SELF-CONCEPT, SOClAL IDENTITY AND I N-
TERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1980). 
30. B. BRAGINSKY, D. BRAGINSKY & R . RING, METHODS OF MADNESS : THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 
AS A LAST R ESORT 49-74 (1969). 
31. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOClAL J UDG-
MENT (1980); Wilson , Self-Deception Without Repression: Limits on Access to Mental States, in SELF-
D ECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING 95, 99-101 (M. Martin , ed. 1985). 
32. !d. ; Nisbett & Wil son, Telling More Than We Know: Verbal Reports on ]\ifenta/ Processes, 
84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 231 (1977). 
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Other research bearing on the rationality of crazy people invo lves 
" token economies," behavior modification regimes wherein sub-
jects-mental patients in this case-are rewarded for approved be-
havior by being given tokens such as points or poker chips Y The 
tokens can then be used to purchase desired goods or increased 
privileges. Token economies are often effective; patients do change 
their behavior in planned, desired ways. Although derived from and 
cast in the theoretical terms of behavioral psychology, token econ-
omies can also be characterized as positing a rational, economic 
theory of human behavior. Studies of the operation of economic 
principles in these programs have found that patients respond to 
changes in relative prices and wages as economic theory predicts 
that rational, normal people respond; that is, patients conform to 
rational choice models by maximizing their expected utilities. 34 The 
effectiveness of token economies and their conformity to "rational 
person" economic models is further evidence that crazy people are 
capable of behaving rationally and that they respond to the same 
incentives as normal people. One must be careful about claiming 
too much on the basis of these studies because infrahuman species 
have also been shown experimentally to behave economically "ra-
tionally. " 35 Studies of human subjects, however, do demonstrate 
mental patients' quite substantial capacity for rational, rule-follow-
ing behavior. 
Less rigorous observations in mental hospitals of patient man-
agement and governance programs provide related evidence about 
patients' capability to act rationally. Wards without token economy 
programs also have rules and procedures that patients are expected 
to follow; patients are expected to understand the rules and to play 
by them. If a patient who begins to threaten violent conduct is 
warned that she will be put in seclusion unless she calms down, the 
33. T. AYLLON & N. AzRIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY: A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND 
REHABILITATION (1968). 
34. Fisher, Winkler, Krasner , Kagel, Battalio & Basmann, Implications for Concepts of Psy-
chopathology of Studies of Economic Principles in Behavior Therapy, 166 J . N ERvous & MENTAL 
DISEASE 187, 191-93 (1978). 
35 . Kagel, Rachlin, Green, Battalio, Basmann & Klemm, Experimental Studies of Consumer 
Demand Behavior Using Laboratory Animals, 13 EcoN. INQUIRY 22 (1975). 
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staff member is treating the patient as a rational maximizer. Sim-
ilarly, patient self-governance programs assume that patients are ca-
pable of setting and enforcing the behavioral rules . Patients do indeed 
understand and play by the rules; otherwise, ward management would 
be impossible. 
The final type of evidence that is directly relevant to crazy peo-
ples' capability for rational action is found in studies of the behavior 
of disordered people in a variety of real world contexts, such as 
driving, holding jobs, managing finances, and responding to situa-
tions eliciting altruism. 36 The general outcome of these studies is 
consistent with the results of research on "laboratory" tasks. Crazy 
people are better able to perform real world tasks than we usually 
assume, and their behavior is often indistinguishable from the be-
havior of normal peopleY Further, studies of social skills training 
demonstrate that socially disabled crazy people can learn to be so-
cially competent. 38 
In sum, a great deal of evidence indicates that crazy people are 
capable of behaving rationally and that their behavioral capabilities 
are not as different from those of normals as we commonly believe. 
I do not contend that people who are considered crazy, especially 
those considered very crazy, are not different from people who are 
considered normal. Some crazy people do seem totally or near totally 
different. It is simply unbelievable to most observers that people 
36. E.g., Armstrong & Whitlock, Mental I!!ness and Road Traffic Accidents, 14 Ausn. & N.Z. 
J. PSYCffiATRY 53 (1980); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1367-69 (E.D. Pa. 1974) 
(mental disorder not inconsistent with competence to manage finances); Howard, The Ex-Mental 
Patient as an Employee: An On-the-Job Evaluation, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 479 (1975); Tolar, 
Kelly & Stebbins, Altruism in Psychiatric Patients: How SociallyConcerned Are the Emotionally Dis-
turbed?, 44 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOLOGY 503 (1976) (in a devised situation that subjects 
thought was real, psychiatric patients demonstrated more altruism than normals; no differences found 
in a paper and pencil task). 
37. See 1 in 5 Adults Lacks Basic Living Ski!!s, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, pt. 1 at I, col. 
I (reporting a large-scale University of Texas study). I am not claiming that all mentally disordered 
people are competent and that a larger percentage of normals than crazy people is not. Once again, 
the claim is simply that the disordered are far less distinguishable than is usually believed. 
38. Brady, Behavior Therapy, 4 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1365, 1372-73 (H. 
Kaplan & B. Sadock eds. 1985); Brown & Munford, Life Ski//s Training for Chronic Schizophrenics, 
171 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 466 (1983); Hansen, St. Lawrence & Christoff, Effects of In-
terpersonal Problem-Solving Training With Chronic After-care Patients on Problem-Solving Com-
ponent Skills and Effectiveness of Solutions, 53 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 167 (1985). 
370 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIE W [Vo l. 90 
who are delusional and wildly out of touch with reality, for example , 
are capable of behaving rationally when their behavior is affected 
by the delusions. On the other hand, even in cases of the most 
extreme disorder , we cannot be certain that such people are inca-
pable of minimal rationality (although it might take great effort for 
them to behave rationally). In the case of most crazy people , the 
evidence supporting broad claims about their incapacity to behave 
rationally is equivocal-little more than an intuitive hunch. 
Again, I do not mean to make an absurd claim. A chronically 
disabled, hallucinating, and delusional person who wanders the streets 
in rags speaking gibberish is not " like" normal persons, and the 
law should probably treat this person specially. Nevertheless , the 
law should be far more cautious before concluding that large num-
bers of crazy people are so incapable of responsible behavior that 
deprivation of liberty is justified. 
I am trying to shift the burden of persuasion on this issue. If 
we simply assume what ' 'everyone'' assumes-that crazy people are 
generally incapable of responsible behavior-then we do not need 
evidence or arguments to support this assumption as a predicate for 
social and legal policy. I am suggesting, however, that in this case, 
the common wisdom is supported primarily by intuition and asser-
tion. Contrary evidence and arguments do exist. Such contrary data 
and arguments do not prove that the common wisdom is wrong and 
that almost all crazy people should be treated just like everyone else. 
The common wisdom is not scientifically proven, however, and so-
ciety and the law should hesitate before acting on it. If we wish to 
treat crazy people differently, let us do so honestly, without pseu-
doscientific rationalizations. Furthermore, as the next section will 
suggest, rather than treating crazy people as different and "other" 
we should redefine our expectations and many institutions to fa-
cilitate the integration of crazy people into the mainstream of so-
ciety. 
IV. NORMATIVE S U GGESTIONS FOR NORMAL TREATMENT OF CRAZY 
PEOPLE 
Let us assume, as we now do , that substantial numbers of crazy 
people are incapable of behaving rationally and that the law is con-
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sequently prima facie justified in treating at least some of them 
specially. Even so, there are good reasons and better methods for 
treating crazy people less specially than their "differentness" might 
theoretically permit. The methods and arrangements that I propose 
will not be utopian and cost-free. \Vhen we consider social change, 
and especially when we resist it , it is easy to forget that no social 
policies, including the present ones, are ideal. If the law treats crazy 
people less specially, some will be forced to suffer consequences of 
their craziness that we should not wish them to bear. A truly unfair 
contract may be enforced; a desperately needy person may not re-
ceive treatment. On the other hand, present policies brand an entire 
class of people as unworthy of the full responsibilities of autono-
mous personhood, fail to achieve their stated purposes, and in an 
enormous number of specific cases, incorrectly deprive people of 
liberty or deem them nonresponsible. 
Confronting honestly the costs of present arrangements is es-
pecially useful when special legal treatment is paternalistically prem-
ised. We should not intervene in the lives of others for their own 
good, especially if doing so requires substantial intrusions on liberty , 
unless we can be quite sure that we will actually improve the lot of 
those we aim to help. 39 Good motives should not lull us into com-
placency about the benign consequences of paternalistic action; in-
stead, we should be skeptical about whether we have done the best 
we can. We should be especially skeptical about the priority of our 
motives when we are dealing with a class of people, such as the 
mentally disordered, who are feared and despised more often than 
they are treated with sympathy and concern. 
With these general considerations in mind, let us turn to specific 
suggestions for treating crazy people less specially. Our society gen-
erally prefers maximizing liberty, even at the cost of increased social 
danger and other social harms. For instance, our criminal justice 
system favors incorrect acquittals to incorrect convictions, and the 
length of a prison term is limited by the offender's desert. Con-
sequently, dangerous and guilty defendants are acquitted, and clearly 
39. See J. KLEINJG, supra note II, at 74-77 . 
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dangerous pnsoners are released at the end of their pnson terms. 
In effect, our society and the law have decided that liberty is 
worth substantial social risks. I believe we should adopt this attitude 
more extensively in our treatment of crazy people.Most mental health 
professionals and legal policymakers, including the majority of those 
who are most paternalistic , favor substantial liberties and legal pro-
tections for crazy people. Nevertheless, I think the law can "take 
more risks" with crazy people at far less cost than we are willing 
to bear in other contexts such as the criminal law. The degree of 
risk that society should be willing to accept might vary from one 
mental health law context to another; the policies underlying laws 
regulating competence to contract, on the one hand, and involuntary 
commitment, on the other, for example, may require different re-
sults. But the preference should always be for less special treatment 
and more risks. 
The law's related assumptions that crazy people cannot fully ap-
preciate liberty and that their problems are primarily medical or 
psychiatric have led to uncreative responses to the social problems 
that crazy behavior produces. If the law focused more strongly on 
protecting and promoting the liberty of crazy persons, more creative 
social solutions might result. For example, some people are homeless 
because mental disorder renders them incompetent to manage the 
simplest affairs of everyday life. Although homeless people are not 
all crazy and some who are crazy are not homeless because they are 
crazy, some cases of homelessness are produced primarily by cra-
ziness.40 
Until about twenty-five years ago, the traditional viewpoint was 
that homelessness among the mentally disordered was primarily a 
medical problem that should be solved by committing the person-
40 . All the homeless are not menta lly disordered and the causes of homelessness are hardly 
clear, but it is virtually certain that some small fraction of the disordered homeless are homeless 
primarily, if not entirely, because of disabilities stemming from their disorder. See C. KIESLER & A. 
SIBULKJN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION : MYTHS AND fACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 199-202(1987) (good 
data on the homeless are surprisingly sparse ; estimates of the percentage of homeless who are mentally 
disordered vary widely; common assumption that homelessness a mo ng the mentall y disordered is 
produced by deinstitutionalization is incorrect) . 
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involuntarily to a mental hospital. 41 But we can also treat home-
lessness as an essentially socioeconomic problem and we should 
remember that a hospital is not a home. There are not many rich 
crazy homeless people because the wealthy have the resources to 
permit adequate care and treatment without inpatient hos pitaliza-
tion. Few rich crazy persons are sleeping on inner city subway grates. 
Indeed, it is possible with proper allocation of resources and creative 
community institutions to treat adequately almost all mental patients 
without hospitalization or with brief hospitalization at most.-~2 Now, 
if involuntary hospitalization, especially on a long-term basis, is dif-
ficult to accomplish, society will be forced generally to attempt the 
less intrusive alternatives that now are readily available only to 
wealthier people or in a few fortunate communities43 (or to admit 
its hypocrisy about claims about caring for poor mentally disordered 
people). My point is not that this is the appropriate response to this 
particular problem, although I think it is; rather, the limited point 
is that a sincere desire to treat crazy people less specially can often 
produce a successful social and legal solution with less deprivation 
of liberty. At the very least, if we know that less intrusive solutions 
are possible , it is more difficult to assume that an intrusive mental 
health law is justified, even if we ultimately adopt it. 
Focusing on treating crazy people less specially can produce a 
desirable shift in social and legal policy by causing reconsideration 
of the determinants of competence. Most mental health laws deprive 
a person of liberty or autonomy because the person is incompetent, 
broadly speaking, to perform one task or another. In the case of 
crazy people, we assume that an intrapersonal variable, craziness, 
produces the incompetence, but this is an oversimplification. A per-
41. Westermeyer, Public Health and Chronic Mental I!!ness, 77 AM. J. PuBLIC HEALTH 667 
(1987). 
42. C. KIES LER & A. SmuLKIN, supra note 40, at 152-80. A recent feasibility study concluded 
that Vermont could dismantle its state hospital system entirely and improve the population's quality 
of mental health care through the use of community-based treatment. Carling , Miller, Daniels & 
Randolph, A State Mental Health System With No State Hospital; The Vermont Feasibility Study, 
38 HosP. & CoMMUNITY PsYCHtATRY 617 (1987) . But see also, Kincheloe & Ettlinger, Commentary: 
A False Dichotomy, 38 HosP. & CoMMUNITY PsYCHtATRY 623 (1987) . 
43. See S. EsTROFF, MAKING IT CRAZY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PsYCHtATRIC CLIENTS IN AN AMER-
ICAN CoMMUN ITY (1981), for an extensive description of a successful program of community care . 
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son ' s competence to perform any task is clearly a product of the 
interaction between the person's cognitive and physical abilities, the 
inherent difficulty of the task, and situational variables that may 
affect either the person's abilities or the difficulty of the task. Vir-
tually anyone, no matter how personally capable, can be rendered 
incompetent to do anything if he or she is placed under sufficient 
kinds of the appropriate stress. Conversely, even extremely "incom-
petent'' persons can be made more competent by a combination of 
personal supports and by redesigning or redefining the necessary 
tasks. 44 For example, physically handicapped persons are able to 
fulfill the demands of otherwise impossible roles if they are given 
various forms of rehabilitation and if the environment is redesigned 
to allow performance of those roles. If office buildings are made 
accessible to those in wheelchairs, physically handicapped persons 
may be able to hold jobs not previously available to them. The 
situation is similar for many mentally disordered people. Provision 
of social skills training and social supports to simplify life tasks can 
enable seemingly disabled people to live reasonably independent 
lives. 45 
Replying simply that such suggestions are unrealistic or that they 
presuppose an inappropriate definition of a task or an environment 
begs the question. One may properly argue that society should not 
spend the resources to ensure lives of greater liberty and independ-
ence for crazy people because such resources would be better spent 
in other ways. Or one may suggest that the present set of social 
expectations or arrangements is justified on (specified) normative 
grounds. But it is misleading to claim that only one set of solutions 
is feasible or "proper." 
Too often social tradeoffs and normative justifications are overtly 
or covertly hidden behind unjustified assertions of the latter type. 
For example, group homes attended by social service personnel might 
enable many crazy people to lead lives of reasonable liberty and 
dignity in the community. Perhaps we do not wish to pay the short 
term capital and other costs of constructing such homes in decent 
44. See Minow, supra note 5, at 184-87. 
45. Jd.; C. KIESLER & A. SIBULKIN, supra note 40, at 152-80. 
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areas because we would rather spend the money elsewhere or perhaps 
we do not wish such homes in "our" neighborhoods, even if they 
are affordable. If so, let us openly admit these reasons, let us admit 
we prefer to exclude the disordered as "other," rather than hiding 
behind the rationalizations that we simply cannot afford such homes, 
that they cannot succeed, or that hospitals are the appropriate places 
for "sick" people. 
Less intrusive means for solving social problems created by men-
tal disorder will routinely be available and may often be cheaper 
than more legally intrusive methods. In the long run , group homes 
will be cheaper than hospitals, for example. 46Nonetheless, a vision 
of the problems that assumes the validity or inevitability of present 
responses will diminish the possibility of discovering and designing 
responses that enhance freedom and achieve other social goals, in-
cluding the integration into society of the mentally disordered. 47 
Another reason to limit differential treatment of crazy and nor-
mal people is that broad mental health laws are often used inap-
propriately and indirectly to achieve allegedly desirable results by 
unjustifiably permitting normal people to be deprived of autonomy 
or to evade responsibility on grounds of craziness. 48 For example, 
assume a wealthy decedent left all her money to a ''fringe'' organ-
ization and impoverished her "deserving" family. 49 Such a will would 
strike many people as unfair to the family, but how can the law 
prevent this disposition of the property in the face of the strong 
social policy favoring testamentary independence? A classic means 
46. See C. KIESLER & A. SIBULKIN, supra note 40, at 179. 
47. Allocating resources for special services for mentally disabled people may seem inconsistent 
with the argument in Section III that the law should not treat disordered people as specially as it 
now does. The possible asymmetry is not troubling, however, because the justification for disadvan-
tageous special treatment ought to be far weightier than the justification for humane special treatment 
of needy people . Some might argue that present special legal treatment, such as involuntary com-
mitment, is generally advantageous to disordered people, but as I have tried to demonstrate in this 
article and elsewhere, this argument is unpersuasive. See, e.g., Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The 
Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54 (1982) . 
48. The classic analysis of this problem is Green , Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unex-
pressed Major Premise , 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944). 
49 . This was the situation in In re Strittmater's Estate , 140 N.J . Eq . 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947), 
where the ardently feminist decedent left all her money to a radical feminist organization. Needless 
to say, the relatives tried to break the will. 
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for invalidating such wills is to find on the basis of psychiatric tes-
timony that the testator was incompetent to make a will.S0 The law 
may then reach the preferred result without quest ioning the general 
policy, but doing so involves a dishonest and degrading legal fiction. 
If we wish to override testamentary independence on distributional 
or justice grounds, we should face this issue and pass appropriate 
laws. 
Now consider the following example of how mental disorder may 
be used illegitimately to evade responsibility. 51 Suppose that a bus-
inessperson fail s to file federal income tax returns for a number of 
years. Assume that she has a hitherto unblemished record and that 
she was the sole support of her model family. Assume further that 
she was under a great deal of financial strain and intentionally de-
cided to chance not filing the returns. In this case, criminal pros-
ecution for tax evasion is fully justified but not appealing; the 
potential defendant has no record, is an otherwise productive mem-
ber of the community, is the sole support of her family, and has 
the resources to mount a defense that will be both difficult and 
expensive for the government to overcome. Failing to prosecute on 
those grounds is an admission of the disparities in treatment the law 
metes out to the rich and poor. If the defendant can claim that the 
strains on her produced mental disorder, then this nice middle-class 
person and her family and friends need not consider it a case of 
dishonesty, and the IRS has a more class-neutral ground for pur-
suing civil rather than criminal remedies. Once again, however, this 
solution allows society to avoid facing the hard question of pros-
ecutorial policy that is really involved. If our general social and legal 
policy is questionable, it should be questioned directly and not evaded 
by using a claim of mental disorder to reach the preferred result in 
the individual case. 
A final suggestion for treating crazy people less specially applies 
when the law acts paternalistically, that is, when the law forcibly 
intervenes primarily for the good of the mentally disordered person. 
50. The judge in Strittmater did exactly this, finding that the decedent's radical feminist views 
were a product of mental disorder. 
5!. The following example is based on a real case from my consu lting practi ce . 
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I suggested earlier and more generally that we should be very cau-
tious before intervening paternalisticallyY In addition, when the law 
decides that paternalistic action is justified, it should apply a sub-
jective standard for the substitution of judgment Y A subjective stan-
dard requires the decisionmaker to ascertain and order what the 
crazy person would have decided and done for himself or herself 
under the circumstances if he or she had been acting competently. 
By contrast , the objective standard asks the decisionmaker to as-
certain and order the course of harm-preventing or good-promoting 
action that a hypothetical reasonable person would have chosen. The 
subjective standard is preferable because it does not impose possibly 
alien values upon the crazy person and thus is a less objectionable 
intrusion on liberty and dignity. The subjective standa rd respects the 
integrity of the person 's reasonably settled values, preferences, and 
goals. Most persons in a free society would prefer that when others 
act for us, they should do for us what we would do for ourselves. 
Making the subjective determination may be difficult, because 
the crazy person seldom will have given prior specific indication of 
what he or she would do under specific circumstances, especially if 
he or she has not previously encountered those circumstances. This 
objection is unconvincing, however , because there often will be spe-
cific indication of the person's wishes. Even if there is no such 
indication, empathetic identification with the person should help the 
decisionmaker to reconstruct the person's value preferences and to 
predict what he or she would have decided. 54 If there is insufficient 
evidence of what the person's preferences would have been under 
the circumstances, the decisionmaker must apply the objective stan-
dard. But the subjective standard should not be rejected in individual 
cases because the person's identifiably settled preferences, expressed 
at a time when he or she was responsible, seem odd, idiosyncratic, 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13. 
53 . See D. VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE 
390-93 (1986) (discussing the various standards for substitution of judgment). Only a brief sketch of 
this very complicated issue is possible here. 
54 . But see D workin , Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4, 13- 14 (1986) (arguing 
that speculation about what an incompetent person would have preferred under assumed cond it ions 
of competence may be relevant to determining the person 's best interests, but that such speculation 
is not a proper foundation fo r respecting autonomy) . 
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or strange. In a pluralistic, liberty-preferring polity, we must respect 
each other's preferences, even if we disagree with them. 
Applying the subjective standard is more expensive and time-
consuming, but the decreased intrusion on the person's life justifies 
the cost. If the subjective standard is too costly, we should be even 
more cautious about behaving paternalistically. The intrusion is 
enormous, and we greatly risk not improving the crazy person's lot 
according to his or her own standards. At the least, we should rec-
ognize and justify the costs of acting paternalistically on an objective 
basis. 
One may question pleas for the expenditure of effort , time, and 
money to treat crazy people less specially by pointing to our policies 
toward children. Because minors as a class are considered less ra-
tional and responsible than adults, few people object to systemat-
ically special legal treatment of children. If one analogizes people 
under the sway of craziness to minors on the ground that immaturity 
and craziness similarly render people incompetent, it may seem that 
differential legal treatment is also justified for crazy people. 
But minors and crazy adults are different in crucial respects. 
First, virtually all crazy people will have shown for substantial por-
tions of their adult lives the capacity for full legal responsibility and 
competence. Second, they will have achieved both the wisdom that 
experience teaches-at least to the extent that anyone achieves such 
wisdom simply by the passage of time-and the longer time-horizons 
that development provides. Children do not achieve these conditions 
by definition, and there is little reason to believe crazy adults achieve 
them substantially less than normal adults. 
Third, we can discern an adult's settled preferences and values 
with reasonable confidence, but children's preferences and values 
are less formed and in flux. Fourth, paternalistic intervention with 
children largely takes place under the direction of parents and par-
ent-substitutes such as teachers who can generally be trusted to act 
in the child's best interests. By contrast , strangers and state rep-
resentatives perform most of the paternalistic intervention in the lives 
of adults. Sociological and historical studies show that paternalism 
by strangers is rarely motivated by the subject's best interests and 
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is far more likely to lead to harm. 55 Indeed, when conflict arises m 
intimate relations-vvhen family members become "strangers" to 
some degree, for example-we least trust paternalistic motives even 
in such contexts. Fifth and last, even children are often treated less 
paternalistica liy when their importan t in terests, such as procreation56 
and free speech, 57 are in issue, and liberty and autonomy are es-
pecially important interests for adults .58 
In sum, my plea is for liberty, creativity, and honesty in men tal 
health law policymaking and adjudication. Even if very crazy people 
are somewhat less responsible than normal people, the lavv' should 
try to preserve their li berty, autonomy, dignity, and integratio n in 
the community as much as possible consistent with sound social 
policy. The law should consider and pursue nonmedical and less 
intrusive legal alternatives that treat crazy people less differently. 
Intrusive mental health laws should be drafted narrowly to a pply 
only to the smallest subset of the disordered for whom such laws 
are absolutely necessary. Finally, social policy trade-offs and dilem-
mas should be faced honestly and directly rather than evaded by 
assuming that only genera l medical solutions are possible or by ac-
cepting bogus claims of mental diso rder in order to reach preferred 
results in individual cases . 
55. Douglas, Cooperative Paternalism versus Conflictf ul Paternalism , in PATERNALISM J 7 1, 175-
80 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983). 
56. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 
~28 U.S. 52 (1976); but see H.L. v. Matheson. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
57. Tinker v. Des Mo ines ind ep . Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1 969) . Bur see Ha-
zelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). 
58. In Parham v . 1 .R. , 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Supreme Court held that no adversar ial pro..::ess 
is necessary when minors are placed in mcmal hospitals by their parents or guardians. Due process 
for the com mitment is satisfi ed by the exercise of the professional judgment of the admitting physician. 
Thi s decision places minimal constraints on paternalistic intervention in the lives of chil dren when 
their physical liberty an d autonomy are at stake, and is therefore a count erexampl e to the te.\tu ai 
di scussion. On the other hand, some state courts that have co nsidered the issue have recognized that 
mino rs, espec ially older minors, deserve substantial procedural protection before their parents or 
guardians may commit th~m to mental hospitals. In re Roger S, 19 Cal. 3d 92 1, 569 P .2d 1286, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). Furthermore, in recognition of the co mpetence of o lder minors, many state 
statutes allow them to give independent informed consent to the receipt of specific or genera l medical 
services. Finally, many of the Court's empirical assu mptions that grounded the decision in Parham 
were erroneous . l'vlelton, Fam ily and Jvferua! Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitmeni of Afinors, in 
CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND TH E LAW 151 (N. Reppucci. L. Weit horn, E. Mulvey & J. Monahan, 
eds . 1984). 
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V. PROCEDURAL POLICIES 
It is difficult to formulate general procedural policies because 
the procedural aspects of mental health law vary from context to 
context. The procedural requirements of an insanity defense trial in 
a capital case are different from those in a social security disability 
hearing. Nonetheless, a few pertinent general suggestions are in or-
der. 
Most important, the law should consistently treat mental health 
cases as serious legal cases that raise social, moral, and political 
issues. Legal formality should be preferred to informality or nonlegal 
decisionmaking, and full adversarial adjudication should be used 
when appropriate. Too often, mental health law cases are treated 
as essentially medical and, consequently, are not taken seriously. 
The allegedly crazy person is poor, powerless, and underrepresented; 
and the proceedings are far too informal to generate a full, indi-
vidualized airing of the important issues involved. Involuntary com-
mitment proceedings, in which the allegedly crazy person can be 
deprived of his or her liberty for substantial periods of time, provide 
a good example. These proceedings are typically brief and informal: 
the lay witnesses necessary for full evaluation of the case rarely 
testify; the allegedly crazy person even more rarely has an expert 
of his or her own; and the defense lawyers typically do not prosecute 
these cases with the "warm zeal" that the canons of ethics require. 59 
An involuntary commitment trial need not be as procedurally en-
cumbered as a criminal trial, but it should be as fully adversarial 
as, for example, a commercial claim for money damages. 
Procedural formality is often viewed as an unjustified hindrance 
to achieving the essentially medical purposes of mental health law. 60 
We have seen already, however, that no mental health law adju-
dicates essentially medical questions; all are concerned with fun-
damental moral, social, political and, ultimately, legal issues. Thus, 
all must be taken legally seriously. Moreover, in those contexts such 
59. C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 7-15, 137-54 
(1982); Morse, A Preference for Liberty, supra note 47, at 76-79. 
60. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-30, 432 (1979). 
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as involuntary commitment, in which the allegedly crazy person rarely 
has the resources to mount a full adversary presentation, there is 
great danger. Disfavored minorities, such as the mentally disordered, 
are far more likely to be the victims of prejudice in informal rather 
than formal proceedings. 61 Failure to individualize by reasonably ad-
versary procedures dehumanizes the disordered person and increases 
the probability of incorrect decisions. 
In recent years, however, the United States Supreme Court has 
demonstrated a disquieting readiness to treat mental health law ques-
tions as essentially medical and to refuse to impose the fullest pos-
si ble procedural protections simply because the Court believes, 
mistakenly, that the issue at stake is medical. The trend began in 
Addington v. Texas, 62 in which the Court declined to impose on the 
state the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt in in-
definite-term involuntary commitment cases. The Court asserted that 
the issues were primarily medical and depended upon expert inter-
pretation of the facts. But whether a person's conduct and mental 
condition justify the involuntary deprivation of liberty is not a med-
ical issue . 
In Parham v. J.R., 63 the Supreme Court deviated from a series 
of cases granting juveniles extensive due process protections. The 
Court held that when parents wish to commit their children to men-
tal hospitals, due process is satisfied if the hospital's mental health 
professional agrees that hospitalization is justified. The Court was 
willing to limit a juvenile's rights not only, or even primarily, be-
cause parental rights were at issue-parental rights were at issue in 
procreation cases, too-but because the Court viewed the commit-
ment of minors as a medical issue. The Court asserted that there 
was little reason to believe judges were better adjudicators of es-
sentially medical questions than mental health professionals, and 
thus it deprived children of neutral, independent decisionmakers. 
61. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wrs. L. REv. 1359, 1387-9 1. 
62. Addington, 441 U.S. 41 8. 
63. Parham , 442 U.S. 584. 
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But, again, whether a child can be totally deprived of liberty and 
stigmatized cannot be solely a medical question. 64 
In Youngberg v. Romeo ,65 the Court considered the substanti ve 
rights to liberty, safety , and habilitation of retarded inmates of a 
state institution and held that the state acted properly to protect 
those rights as long as professional judgment was exercised in man-
aging the insti tution and devising individual treatment plans . Al-
though Youngberg is not a procedural case, it essentially converted 
legal questions about the scope of patients' rights into questions that 
could be decided by mental health professionals on the basis of their 
mental health judgment. 
Most recently , in Allen v. Illinois, 66 the Court considered whether 
the fifth amendment guaranteed a defendant in a quasi-criminal, 
sexual dangerousness commitment proceeding the right to remain 
silent. The Court held that because the purpose of the proceedings 
was to provide treatment, the usual protections of the criminal jus-
tice system need not apply. The Court disapproved of any unnec-
essary hindrances to ascertaining and interpreting the facts necessary 
to make what it viewed as primarily a medical decision. Once again, 
however, it is an error to decide the case by label rather than by 
serious consideration of what is at stake legally and politically. My 
point is not that the decision was necessarily wrong, although once 
again I think the decision was mistaken; it is simply that it is based 
on a mistakenly medical premise. 
The central themes underlying all these opinions are that mental 
health law cases raise primarily medical or psychiatric issues, that 
strict procedural formalities are an unjustified obstacle to proper 
resolutions of the issues, and that mental health professionals are 
the best sources of providing and interpreting the facts and even of 
deciding the issues. These cases are unsettling because they reflect 
at the highest level a basic misunderstanding of the issues and be-
64. As is so often true in mental health cases, the Court based its opinion on a number of 
factual assumptions that are simply unsupportable . See supra note 58. 
65. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U .S. 307 (1982). 
66 . Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986) . 
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cause their outcomes are certain to decrease the welfare of mentally 
disordered people. In all contexts in which mentally disordered peo-
ple are strangers, reducing the procedural barriers to treating them 
specially will ensure that they are treated specially in a more negative 
way. 
To be more specific, allegedly crazy people should be represented 
in all contexts by counsel who should seek to accomplish what the 
client wishes, or, if the clients' wishes are unclear, to prevent in-
trusion on the clients' liberty. Some might argue that this will pre-
vent the allegedly crazy person from receiving needed care, treatment, 
or protection from physical, financial, or social ruin. But an ad-
versary system is premised on the assumption that the truth is best 
determined by a fully adversarial airing of the issues, and there is 
no reason to believe that the theory is less applicable in mental health 
cases. It is the duty of the state or any other party alleging that a 
person is crazy to prove that the criteria for the application of mental 
health laws are satisfied. In relatively clear cases, the moving party 
will be able to do so, even if it is opposed by active, competent 
adversary counsel. In less clear cases, good attorneys may cause the 
system to err by underapplying mental health laws. In unclear cases, 
however, this is precisely the preferable error in a society that prefers 
liberty and the presumption of personal responsibility. Indeed, the 
consequences of erroneous overapplication of mental health laws-
deprivation of liberty, autonomy, and dignity-are the most serious 
that our legal system can produce. Finally, counsel who follow their 
clients' wishes respect the autonomy and dignity of their clients. This 
is how lawyers should behave, even if they believe that the clients' 
choices are wrong. If lawyers acted in all cases as they do in mental 
health cases, few clients would be represented well, because to rep-
resent clients effectively, lawyers must often actively argue positions 
with which they disagree. 
In addition to requiring full adversarial representation by lawyers 
on both sides, mental health law cases should be decided primarily 
by judges, rather than by panels of laypersons or by mental health 
experts. Society can choose to delegate decisionmaking authority in 
such cases, but doing so would be a mistake. Judges can also con-
flate medical and legal issues, but they are best situated by training , 
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experience, and role definition to be neutral decisionmakers who 
recognize the moral and political nature of their legal tasks. Once 
again, the ultimate issues in mental health cases are not medical or 
scientific, and mental health professionals are not expert on the for-
mal resolution of nonmedical issues. Society should not delegate 
essentially legal tasks to nonlegal decisionmakers. Additionally, as 
noted before, decreased formality in a decisionmaking process may 
cut time and cost, but only at the counteracting cost of substantially 
increasing the risk of prejudice toward disfavored minorities. The 
integrity of legal decisionmaking and the welfare of the disordered 
require that mental health cases should be decided by judges or other 
neutral legal decisionmakers. 
Allegedly crazy people must also have access to mental health 
experts of their own, especially if the law fails to reform the rules 
and procedures for evaluating legal craziness. The United States Su-
preme Court recently ruled in Ake v. Oklahoma67 that criminal de-
fendants with a colorable claim of legal insanity were entitled to the 
services of a mental health professional to aid their defense, but 
this is not required in many mental health law contexts, including 
involuntary commitment and conservatorship proceedings. An al-
legedly crazy wealthy person can of course hire an expert, but an 
allegedly crazy indigent person cannot obtain the assistance of an 
independent professional unless the state pays for it. Because courts 
routinely view the issues as largely medical and defer to the sole 
expert that the state retains, it is crucial in proceedings where liberty 
is at stake for the allegedly crazy person to have his or her own 
witness. Providing advocate experts in the appropriate contexts will 
be expensive and may even encourage the battle of the experts, but 
these are the inevitable costs of deciding to treat crazy people spe-
cially to the detriment of their liberty and autonomy. If the scope 
of expert testimony is limited by relying on observations rather than 
on irrelevant diagnostic and legal conclusions,68 the provision of ad-
67. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
68. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 527, 600-26 (1978); Morse,Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and 
1he Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971-83, 1044-59 (1982) . 
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vocate experts will not create an even more unseemly battle of the 
experts than now obtains. 
In those cases in which an advocate expert is not required by 
due process or is not available for other reasons, the court should 
be aware and should attempt to ensure that the jury recognizes that 
the sole expert is not impartial. The court should require that the 
sole expert be fully cross-examined. Judges should know and juries 
should be instructed that unopposed expert testimony should be as-
sessed cautiously and that it may be disregarded entirely. I also 
suggest that a trial or appellate court should almost never overturn, 
as a matter of law, a jury or judge's decision on the ground that 
it is contrary to the weight of the expert evidence, even if the verdict 
disregards unanimous expert testimony to the contrary. A factfin-
der's decision should not be overridden under such circumstances 
because mental health law questions are primarily moral and social, 
not scientific. There can be no ''weight of expert evidence'' on the 
ultimate legal issue. 
Vigorous, complete adversary procedures will not be a panacea 
in mental health law adjudication, especially if the law does not 
adopt necessary limitations on expert testimony, but they will pro-
mote greater honesty and integrity in decisionmaking and ensure that 
crazy people are treated specially only when such treatment is truly 
justified. 
